I. INTRODUCTION

Jurisdiction is an aspect of state sovereignty and it refers to judicial, legislative and administrative competence. Although jurisdiction is an aspect of sovereignty, it is not coextensive with it. In India, the jurisdictional aspect of copyright is taken care of by section 62 of the Copyright Act, 1957 (hereinafter referred to as Act). The analysis of that section reveals that its scope is much wider than the jurisdictional ambits of section 20 of C.P.C. The Act provides a wider jurisdictional power to the courts to try the matters pertaining to copyright violations as compared to C.P.C, 1908 because section 62 prescribes an “additional ground” for attracting the jurisdiction of a Court over and above the 'normal' grounds as laid down in Section 20 of the Code. Secondly, section 62 (2) starts with a non-obstante clause which will give an overriding effect to this section in case there is any inconsistency, if any, between this section and the provisions of C.P.C. Lastly, the expression “include”, as used in section 62(2), shows that it is capable of accommodating not only the traditional jurisdictional mandates but even those requirements which may arise in future due to change in technology and other circumstances. The object and reason for the introduction of sub-section (2) of Section 62 was not to restrict the owners of the copyright to exercise their rights but to remove any impediment from their doing so.

II.JUDICIAL RESPONSE

The question of territorial jurisdiction of the court to deal with copyright infringement was considered by the courts on several occasions.

In Caterpillar Inc v Kailash Nichani the plaintiff, a foreign company, was carrying on business in several places in India including Delhi, through its Indian distributors and collaborators. The plaintiff claimed the relief of ad-interim injunction for preventing infringement of its copyright by the defendant, though the defendant was dealing in different goods. The Delhi high Court held that it was not necessary to show that the business being carried on by the plaintiff in Delhi should necessarily be in respect of footwear and articles of clothing as well. It is sufficient if the business was being carried on by the plaintiff in Delhi and further that there was an infringement of plaintiff’s copyright in respect of certain goods, which were being sold by the defendant in Delhi. The court further held that section 62 of the Copyright Act makes an obvious and significant departure from the norm that the choice of jurisdiction should primarily be governed by the convenience of the defendant. The legislature in its wisdom introduced this provision laying down absolutely opposite norm than the one set out in section 20 CPC. The purpose is to expose the transgressor with inconvenience rather than compelling the sufferer to chase after the former.

In Lachhman Das Behari Lal v Padam Trading Co the Delhi High Court observed that the plaintiff being a firm functioning at Delhi, the suit filed by it in the Delhi courts is maintainable and is not liable to be rejected under Order 7 Rule 11 of the CPC as prayed. The Court further observed that the plea regarding want of territorial jurisdiction is not covered by Order7 rule 11 of CPC. The court observed that even if it is held that this court has not the territorial jurisdiction, the plaint cannot be rejected. At the most it can be returned for presentation to the proper court.

In Exphar Sa & Anr v Eupharma Laboratories Ltd & Anr the Supreme Court finally settled the position in this regard. The Court observed:
“ Section 62(2) cannot be read as limiting the jurisdiction of the District Court only to cases where the person instituting the suit or other proceeding or where there are more than one such persons, any of them actually and voluntarily resides or carries on business or presently works for gain. It prescribes an additional ground for attracting the jurisdiction of a court over and above the “normal” grounds as laid down in Section 20 of the C.P.C. Even if the jurisdiction of the Court were restricted in the manner construed by the Division Bench, it is evident not only from the cause title but also from the body of the plaint that the Appellant No 2 carries on business within the jurisdiction of the Delhi High Court. The Appellant No 2 certainly “a person instituting the suit”. The Division Bench went beyond the express words of the statute and negatived the jurisdiction of the Court because it found that the Appellant No 2 had not claimed ownership of the copyright, infringement of which was claimed in the suit. The appellant No 2 may not be entitled to the relief claimed in the suit but that is no reason for holding that it was not a person who had instituted the suit within the meaning of Section 62(2) of the Act”.

END OF PART -V
TO BE CONTINUED

ALL RIGHTS RESERVED WITH THE AUTHOR.