South Asians seem to have succeeded in making world diplomacy look like a
hopeless a charade. It seemingly impresses neither India nor Pakistan. A
succession of world's Presidents, Prime ministers, Foreign Ministers and
special envoys have either spoken to or visited New Delhi and Islamabad to
urge restraint on India and to ask Pakistan 'to do more to stop
cross-border terrorism' in the Indian-controlled Kashmir. Pakistan says it
has done that and India says we have shown exemplary restraint for six
months. International opinion remains confused and appalled because all can
see the looming threat of a nuclear exchange.

Talking of nuclear war elicits answers in Delhi and Islamabad on two
levels. Indian Defence Minister George Fernandes, who doubles as a hawkish
Indian nationalist ever ready to punish Pakistan and a nuclear dove, has
issued a certificate of sanity, good official behaviour and being
responsible leaders to Pakistan's rulers. That was to allay outside world's
fear of nuclear weapons being used. His aim seemed to include the
expectation that the outside world will thereby leave the even more sane
and responsible Indian government alone to 'teach Pakistan a lesson', as
many hawkish Indians regularly put it.

In Pakistan the government uses the same two tracks. At one level it says
being smaller and weaker side, Pakistan cannot surrender the right to use
nuclear weapons first, just as America and NATO could not give up the No
First Use right vis-à-vis Warsaw Pact powers. At another level or in other
context, it says these mass destruction weapons are so obnoxious that no
sane person can contemplate their use at all; please don't worry. It looks
as if both sides were addressing heavy outside pressure, and maybe each
other.

Indian authorities continue to inspire stories in foreign press that Indian
Army is too keyed up for offensive action and that Indian government will
have to permit a 'limited action' in Azad Kashmir before the onset of the
monsoons in that area. Apparently, this is good psy warfare. Anyhow the
situation remains wholly uncertain after the return of the two American
envoys from South Asia: Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and Deputy
Secretary of State Richard Armitage. Hitherto the Indians and Pakistanis
have not been able to go to war or to begin any dialogue --- a position
that has obtained for six months. Some Pakistani commentators say that the
Indian government does not know how to de-escalate without being able to
show to its supporters and voters some achievement (victory) for this six
month long verbal offensive.

This is however mistaken. India has made solid gains: first, Pakistan
President has been at pains to assure every visitor to Islamabad that
'nothing is happening across the LOC'. There is a world of difference
between what he used to say even in the spring of this year --- that
terrorism is one thing and freedom fight is another --- and what he is
saying now. One way or another, President Pervez Musharraf has paid a heavy
domestic price for slowly moving away from his earlier Kashmir stance. The
terms of discourse between outsiders and Pakistani rulers are different
now: earlier a policy change was demanded; now, under Mr. A.B. Vajpayee's
goading the world demands a 'proof' that the change of policy has taken
effect.

That said, the business of keeping Pakistan under pressure does not seem
likely to end anytime soon. At this point the bottomline of India has been
met: Pakistan has ceased to send infiltrators across LOC. That does not
automatically end the insurgency in Kashmir. First there are an indefinite
number of local Kashmiri Jihadis who might carry on with their campaign;
some (earlier) Pakistan-supported Jihadis might still be on the wrong side
of the LOC; but above all else Syed Salahuddin, the President of the TU of
all Jihadi outfits and of Hizbul Mujahideen, has said that the Jihad in
Kashmir will continue no matter what policy does the Pakistan government
adopt. This declaration has to be taken seriously.

At this point the domestic political situation of Pakistan requires to be
taken into account. Musharraf's policy switch on Taliban in October last
year is still sending shockwaves. Pakistan's Rightwing as a whole is
teeming with lovers of Taliban while few knew anything about Al-Qaeda or
even Osama. The more west-oriented upper class rightists clearly understand
why Musharraf made the U-turn on Afghanistan. But many religiously-oriented
people remain wholly unreconciled. A backlash against Musharraf's policies
is building up. The new Kashmir policy will make many more rightists
irreconciled to the changes. Most regarded the early May suicide bombing
attack in Karachi that killed 12 French engineers as a warning shot across
Musharraf's bows. More attacks are expected.

The overall situation for the General-President is not easy: he faces a
revolt in his own constituency. The fact that there is now again a military
government in Pakistan may be its greatest weakness. The Army regime is
politically isolated. It can neither make big decisions and sell them to
the people nor can it keep the people united and reasonably inclined
towards its new foreign policy. Why? because the military regime is unable
of appreciating the complexities of the political situation while it
undertakes the sickeningly familiar exercises of entrenching the Army in
the political and economic life of Pakistan by fiat --- as if nothing has
changed in 55 years. The effort is bound to divide the people further.

It is true that there is a wide open exit door for the military to depart
rather than to entrench in power. This is what the national situation and
interest demand. There can be any number of expeditious ways of beating
retreat from a vulnerable political position that is clearly hurting the
country. But personal security of generals --- not of one but of many
generals, perhaps of the whole institution --- may be involved. Pakistan's
biggest misfortune is the narrowness of mind and political illiteracy of
its Army's officer corps.