INDIA’S FOREIGN POLICY PREDICAMENTS
by Dr. Subhash Kapila

The end of a year is a good time for stocktaking of political developments that have passed and analyzing their impact on the course of future policies and prospects. India has gone through a turbulent year in 2002 in all aspects- politically, strategically and militarily. These call in to question the foreign policy course that has been followed by India in the last couple of years. It can be said that on the verge of 2003, India faces serious foreign policy predicaments which would dictate a review and re-prioritisation of its foreign policy objectives.

The two major developments that have generated India’s foreign policy predicaments in the past year were:

* United States policy changes and foreign policy fixations post-9/11 (September 11, 2001 bombings in New York and Washington by Islamic Jehadis).

* Pakistan’s Islamic Jehadis armed attack on India’s Parliament House on 13/12 (December13, 2001).

Combined together, an analysis of the policies and developments that followed in the wake of these dastardly events, the major deductions that arise for India are:

* United States war on global terrorism declared post-9/11 was US-centric designed to serve US national security interests only. If there was to be a long-drawn American war on global terrorism, it would appear that it would be sequential only. That is the American war on global terrorism on threats to other countries would follow only after US-centric threats were dealt with.

* In the US-centric war on global terrorism, the United States was willing to co-opt known terrorist states like Pakistan which had a direct linkage to both 9/11 and 13/12 events.

* Russia and China, both affected by Islamic Jehadi terrorism, were not willing to take stands against the United States on the more questionable aspects of its global war on terrorism.

* The West European countries with large Muslim expatriate populations were unable to take strong stands against Islamic Jehadi terrorism. In terms of priorities, they followed the US lead.

* All these countries, following the United States lead, chose to pressurize India from taking military action against Pakistan post 13/12 on specious grounds.

* In the South Asian context, India could not expect any significant support for dealing with Pakistan’s proxy war against India, barring some token support from Russia.

Keeping the above in mind, India’s foreign policy predicaments need to be addressed by a re-evaluation of its major foreign policy relationships and objectives.

India and the United States No Longer “Natural Allies”: United States policies and actions post-9/11 belie the earlier stated and mutual high expectations of a “natural allies” relationship. If it were truly so, then the combination of 9/11 and 13/12 would have spurred the United States to recognize, respect and integrate the Islamic Jehadi threats against India with the overall American operations against global terrorism (read Islamic Jehadi terrorism).

More inexplicable has been the United States shielding of Pakistan from the Indian military wrath post 13/12. It virtually amounted to a Papal condonation of Pakistan’s mortal sins.

India therefore needs to adopt a more conditional foreign policy relationship with the United States. The United States may be the unipolar super power, in the world today, but there are limits to unipolar power too. India needs to arrive at declared specified bench-marks which the United States needs to adhere to in its South Asian policies. This would remove the ambiguities which seem to prevail today and let US pressures prevail on India.

India’s foreign policy responses to the United States must depend on the American respect for India’s bench-marks for USA in the context of its South Asian policies. India is in a position to lay down bench-marks; this strength should emanate from her strategic potential both in South Asia and the Indian Ocean region.

India and Russia Need to be More Explicit: It was Russia in the post-Cold War era which moved away from its strategic partnership with India prompted by the predominance of “ Westernists” over the “Orientalists” in its foreign policy establishment. Another contributory reason was Russia’s rather pronounced overtures to strike an oversized strategic partnership with China.

The utility of both of the above Russian foreign policy attitudes seem to be diluted today. India and Russia have many convergences in their strategic interests. It is time that both countries adopt more explicit attitudes and declarations of intents.

Once again India has to deliberate and arrive at specified bench marks that Russia needs to follow if it wishes to endow more value on its relationship with India.

What can be said of Russia with credit is that this country has not strategically de-stabilised South Asia at India’s expense, like the United States and China.

India’s Need for Firmness and Assertion in South Asia: In the last two or three years, India has allowed the United States to devalue its natural pre-eminence in South Asia because of America’s Pak-centric priorities. India has to break out of this shell by being more firm and assertive. The only challenge to India’s pre-eminence arises from:

* Pakistan fortified by United States and China’s strategic priorities in terms of balance of power politics in South Asia.

* United States uncertainties about India’s future strategic directions and intents.

* China’s perception of India as a strategic threat and consequent Chinese policies arising from this perception.

As far as India’s future strategic direction and intents are concerned, there should be no ambiguity. India should declare its intention to emerge as South Asia's pre-dominant power-politically, strategically and militarily. India’s foreign policies should not be apologetic about this assertion.

Arising from this objective, India needs to assert that:

* Kashmir is non-negotiable and all external powers need to lay-off this issue.

* India’s dominance model may be an anathema for Pakistan but that country has to adjust and adapt to this strategic reality . India’s foreign policy initiatives must emphasize to powers external to the region to respect this reality and prevail over their protégé, Pakistan, to recognize it too.

* India must declare that any threats to its external or internal security will be met by disproportionate force if necessary.

* No external pressures will be accepted by India to deflect it from its pursuance of just war or pre-emptive strikes to deter aggression against India.

India’s Foreign Policies and the Military Muscle Component: India’s foreign policy predicaments arise and have arisen in the past, chiefly, due to the absence or crafting of an effective military muscle component as an integrated part of its foreign policy formulations.
Bold foreign policies would need the creation of a sizable military machine which could meet the requirements of being a regional power. Three immediate steps in this directions as starters should be:

* Defense budget be pegged at a minimum of 3% of GDP as a legislated policy formulation.

* India’s nuclear doctrine should remove the policy of “ No First Use” (NFU). NFU should only be applicable against non nuclear countries.

* Crash programme to test fire and operationalize India’s ICBM. The SLBM project should be speeded up.

Conclusion: India in the past year has stood victimized incessantly by Pakistan’s proxy war and Islamic Jehadi terrorism. This despite constant United States advice and admonishments. India’s massive military mobilization post-13/12 for nearly ten months failed in terms of coercing Pakistan to desist from military adventurism. It failed because India under pressure from USA failed to take the next sequential step after coercion was not effective i.e. military strikes against Pakistan. All said and done, the past year i.e. 2002 and the political developments that were part of it clearly indicate the following foreign policy imperatives:

* India’s need to craft her foreign policy relationships on a systemised basis of bench-marks and ‘quid-pro-quos’.

* India needs to expand and upgrade her strategic military might on the lines stated above and with special reference to operationalise ICBMs and SLBMs. This would add significant weightage to India's foreign policy formulations and initiatives.

The world respects power and power is what India desperately needs, including the will to use power to further the ends of her foreign policies.