A conflict of interest involving one of the members of Executive Board (EB) of Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) has come to light. Its member, Ndiaye Cheikh Sylla from Senegal is current serving as a fellow with the World Bank’s PCFplus while continuing in his role on the Executive Board, a position he will hold until 2004.

This is a blatant and disturbing conflict of interest that comes at a time when the Board is considering decisions that will have a huge impact on the PCF portfolio. Mr Sylla must resign from one of these two positions immediately. A clear separation between the Executive Board and project developers must be maintained.

The details of Mr Sylla’s appointment are contained in the PCFplus workplan for 2004. It states that he is expected to serve as a PCFplus fellow from 1 July to 15 August. The UNFCCC Secretariat has been apprised of this conflict of interest ahead of the July 28-29 Board meeting but has received no substantive response, yet in the report of that meeting it was noted that Mr Sylla would absent himself from considering baseline and monitoring methodology approvals. While this represents a recognition of the conflict of interest it does not resolve it.

Every decision that Mr Sylla takes as an EB member directly impacts on the PCF and his fellowship with the PCF while serving as a Board member is totally unacceptable. The timing of this fellowship is particularly inappropriate given that the Board is considering and developing guidance on such crucial issues as additionality, decisions that the PCF is actively seeking to influence.

CDM Watch, SinksWatch, The Corner House and International Rivers Network (IRN) have for immediate action to rectify the blunder. The CDM Executive Board ought to urgently resolve this issue without further delay.

There must be a clear and visible separation between the Executive Board and project developers if the approvals process is to be credible, says Ben Pearson of CDM Watch. Having a Board member working with one of the largest project developers at a time when the Board is elaborating crucial project rules is totally unacceptable. It is blatant conflict of interest that must be resolved immediately, he adds.

According to the annexure on modalities and procedures for a clean development mechanism pursuant to Decision 15/CP.7 of UNFCCC on principles, nature and scope of the mechanisms pursuant to Articles 6, 12 and 17 of the Kyoto Protocol, “the executive board may suspend and recommend to the COP/MOP the termination of the membership of a particular member, including an alternate member, for cause including, inter alia, breach of the conflict of interest provisions, breach of the confidentiality provisions, or failure to attend two consecutive meetings of the executive board without proper justification.”

The members are bound by the rules of procedure of the executive board. They do not pecuniary or financial interest in any aspect of a CDM project activity or any designated operational entity, says the annexure.

The executive board comprises of ten members from Parties to the Kyoto Protoco. Its composition entails one member from each of the five United Nations regional groups; two other members from the Parties included in Annex I; two other members from the Parties not included in Annex I; and one representative of the small island developing States, taking into account the current practice in the Bureau of the Conference of the Parties.

The Conference of the Parties serves as the meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (COP/MOP) and has authority over and provide guidance to the clean development mechanism (CDM).

The members are elected for a period of two years and are eligible to serve a maximum of two consecutive terms. Terms as alternate members do not count. Five members and five alternate members were elected initially for a term of three years and five members and five alternate members for a term of two years. Thereafter, the COP/MOP elects every year, five new members, and five new alternate members, for a term of two years. The members, and alternate members remain in office until their successors are elected.

The executive board meets as and when necessary but no less than three times a year. All the decisions by the executive board are taken by consensus whenever possible. If all efforts at reaching a consensus have been exhausted and no agreement has been reached, decisions are taken by a three-fourths majority of the members present and voting at the meeting. The members abstaining from voting are considered as not voting.