Research, analysis and discussion on the various and devious strategies of the Imperialists (US primarily). Counterinsurgency and high technology breakthroughs that threaten to make resistance impossible. Possible counter measures for guerrilla and civil groups will be addressed and readers forwarded to sites that focus on these issues. Translations into spanish, portuguese and german will be sought.
Rifleman democracy.2004 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------
politics as possible link
There is a theory of "rifleman democracy".
Machiavelli set out this theory, saying that a man without a gun is in no way comparable to a man with a gun. Aside from Machiavelli's better known ideas, as expressed in THE PRINCE, he also proposed that a practical possibility could be seen in the democratic republic as a form of government (seen as exemplified by the small city-state – not anything of more than 10 million people) and this was a very possible (positive ?) development. Machiavelli believed these democratic republics would be established because of the development of more accurate fire-arms, namely, rifles. One rifle is carried by one man. So, basically, one rifle = one vote. That was the format of "rifleman democracy" which enabled Napoleon to transform Europe out of feudalism. (Napoleon lost as an individual, but Europe was transformed forever.)
Now, however, we have a much more complicated situation when viewing democracy as an expression of, or as determined by, realities of warfare. The U.S. did not even get involved in trying to disarm Iraqis from their AK-47's. RPG's, however, that's another matter. Anti-aircraft weapons, etc., are far more important than rifles. What it comes down to is that even individual snipers require a support system (extending to helicopters and control of the air-space) in order to function in their DEFENSE OR ATTACK roles.
Traditional individual fire-arms have, for good reason, been known as "equalizers". The days when an armored knight was equal, say, to 30 yeoman --- that period of history ended with the development of the modern rifle. Of course, it has been more complicated than one man, one rifle, one vote, for some time now. Napoleon's successes depended upon his ability to recruit, inspire and utilize riflemen --- but he was also known for his unequaled use of cannon fire in connection with infantry battles. Everything changed with the development of the machine gun about a century ago. Machine guns were operated by teams, rather than individuals, and machine guns gobbled up ammo so fast that considerable supporting infrastructure is required. Thus, the theory of "superior fire power" that was developed out of World War I and the millions of men sacrificed in futile efforts to attack and take fortified machine gun positions on static front-lines. Then came World War II --- air power and control of the air space are everything.
Warfare and revolution have been transformed by high-tech, like everything else in the world. Outcomes can no longer be forecast by counting heads. The whole is more than the sum of the parts. So, to be successful, revolutionaries must think in terms of high-tech, outside-the-box, teamwork and specialties. It's a complex calculation anymore.
A sign of impending demise of the Empire is that the people at the top tend to believe their own propaganda. Hitler, for example, was told as early as 1939 about the U.S. (Boeing Aircraft) tooling up to be capable of making more bombers in a month than existed in all countries combined in 1939. Basically, Hitler was told that attacking Poland and starting World War II was bound to fail in the long run. Hitler fired the messenger and brought in someone who would tell him what he wanted to hear. That is the arrogance part of it. The other part of imperial break-down has to do with corruption.
[NOTE: ( From a reader comment) Falluja and Najaf in Iraq support and also question this anaysis: Rifles do seem important - though the RPGs and anti-aircraft weapons (and mortars) may be more important. As the author says: " successful, revolutionaries must think in terms of high-tech, outside-the-box, teamwork and specialties," and the cultural cohesiveness (teamwork) seems to combine with cleverness, a feel for media-propaganda and news/action timming to create a powerful force to block the military power of the invader (U.S.) The case of the AFRC guerrillas in COlombia is another example of this interplay - riflemen and teamwork in a culture of resistance!]
http://www.adtdl.army.mil/cgi-bin/atdl.dll/fm/7-98/F798_3.htm#REF29h4 Photos
http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&ie=UTF-8&oe=UTF-8&q=%22Chechnya+Photographs%22&spell=1 see also:
http://zorpia.com/cgi/album.cgi?00033836 Sizzlin Hot Links
http://www.cdi.org/program/document.cfm?DocumentID=1481&StartRow=11&ListRows=10&&Orderby=D.DateLastUpdated&ProgramID=23&typeID=(4,5)&from_page=relateditems.cfm The United States is the world’s largest small arms producer. The United States is home to the largest number of companies of any single arms producing country. It is also a major exporter of small arms, and has one of the world’s largest domestic markets for firearms. The United States is estimated to export approximately 400,000 small arms, including military firearms, every year. This is one more reason why United States has the responsibility to lead, not merely comply with existing international agreements.
NEW US WEAPONS SYTEMS
http://www.cdi.org/program/issue/index.cfm?ProgramID=39&issueid=49 http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/links.htm http://www.adtdl.army.mil/cgi-bin/atdl.dll/fm/7-98/F798_2.htm#REF4h4 http://www.cdi.org/program/document.cfm?DocumentID=1635&StartRow=11&ListRows=10&&Orderby=D.DateLastUpdated&ProgramID=39&typeID=(8)&from_page=relateditems.cfm Story on Deserter – Dudayev
http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/9604/24/dudayev/index.html http://www.russiajournal.com/news/cnews-article.shtml?nd=42655 INTRODUCING IMPERIALIST STRATEGIES
OF CONTROL & AGGRESSION
From Spirit of Liberty
There are three stages of escalation that the ruling class employs to control everything that it needs to control.
I. They promote a shallow, unrepresentative, liberal democracy when the people demand involvement in their affairs. The ruling class assures that dynasties, family-gangs or business oligarchies dominate control, sometimes with alternating figureheads. Assassinations or coups are used as needed. This type of government is really just a PR or an opinion collecting organization.
II. Control tactics for combating protesters and rioting are well developed, tested and written about everywhere: Stryker transports, water cannons, chemical weapons, robo-cops, electronic weapons and infiltration, intimidation and assassinations are coordinated to suit the situation. Large-scale detentions are eventually used: such as the 2 million in the US prison system, the 9000 terror-suspect detainees in the US (held without charges), and the many thousands of enemy combatants held at Guantanamo and the other torture centers in Morocco, Egypt, Turkey, and Israel. Additionally the Iraqi-Model of holding 40-60,000 people for months or years without charges will be expanded despite the prisoner abuse scandals. Under this type of regime, disappearances, wrongful arrest and extreme forms of torture (including of your children/wife in front of you) will become (are) common-place.
III. This paper examines the third and final phase of control employed by the government to avoid real democracy or challenges to corporate wealth: martial law and civil war.
In order for citizens to function as independent and responsible actors, they need to know what the government is up to. As with commercial investments and development, the military is planning far ahead and their planning actually helps to create what will happen through the responses of their enemies and the urge to use new technologies and new operational tactics.
.....This paper seeks to inform and to learn from the input that we receive from you –
1.2 Glossary of Terms:
AFSOF -- Air Force Special Operation Forces
CAS -- Close Air Support
CIA -- Central Intelligence Agency (
http://members.aol.com/bblum6/American_holocaust.htm) C3I -- Command, Control, Communication and Intelligence
C4I --Command, Control, Communication, Computation & Intelligence
COMINT -- Communication Intelligence
DIA -- Defense Intelligence Agency
DoD -- US Department of Defense
FLIR -- Forward Looking Infra-Red
HIC -- High Intensity Conflict
HUMIT -- Human Intelligence
LIC -- Low Intensity Conflict
NSA -- National Security Agency
OOTW -- Operations Other Than War
PGM -- Precision Guided Munitions
SAM -- Surface-to-Air Missiles
SAR -- Synthetic Aperture Radar
SIGINT -- Signal Intelligence
USSOCOM -- Special Operations Command
UAV -- Unmanned Airborne Vehicle
The government has to create enemies if there are none large enough to justify their wasteful spending and control activities. This is the building block that goes unmentioned in almost all media and even among many fringe groups: the government makes mistakes on purpose, they create chaotic situations (Iraq, Colombia, Pakistan, Israel) so that they can stir up trouble and start patriotic wars to entrance and humble their people - as well as their current and future victims of aggression.
As we enter the final phase of the Imperialist Game Plan, the government is preparing on every front for widespread and sustained guerrilla wars against the people of the US (and their Constitution) and also against people everywhere in the wolrd who refuse to submit to imperial decree.
Here are some of their plans:
U.S. Military Commands:
See GLobal Photo at:
http://www.cdi.org/issues/usforces/commands.html The U.S. is the only state which divides the entire globe into military commands with a general or admiral in command of each region and designated forces. This practice began during World War II when global warfare forced the U.S. armed services to change from small, separate branches into an integrated armed force that deployed vast land, sea, and air forces around the globe. This practice of assigning U.S. military forces responsibility for specific regions worldwide is known as the Unified Command Plan (UCP).
Recent changes in US Military Command are: the merger of U.S. Strategic and U.S. Space Commands. This means that from Oct. 1, there will be 9 Unified Commands (composed of units from two or more military services):
Geographical Responsibilities:
Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) (Bases/HQ in Colorado Springs and Washington DC)
Pacific Command (USPACOM) (Hawaii?)
Central Command (USCENTCOM)
European Command (USEUCOM)
Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) (Miami, Florida, & Roosevelt Roads, Puerto Rico)
Functional Responsibilities:
Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) (same as USSOUTHCOM)
Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM)
Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM)
Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM)
NORTHCOM AND SOUTHCOM/USSOCOM are the primary tools for the Western Hemisphere.
The following examples show how the Imperialist war planners think:
Measures of Guerrilla Strength
The main measures of insurgent strength include: military capability; endurance; basic cause (self-determination, religion, ideology, nationality, class) and motivation; extent of influence on the media and through it on the target population; allies (states and guerrilla movements) and weapon systems.
Guerrilla as a Strategic Threat
The existential threat presented by guerrilla warfare derives from the guerrilla movement's goal of capturing a given territory and a given population controlled at the time by the regime, and sometimes also of destroying the existing regime. Guerrilla activities corrode social and political cohesion, and call into question the internal security of the state and its individual citizens. Even when a strategic threat is identified, the regime continues to counter it largely with military means, without recognizing the need to act against all the guerrilla's sources of power.
…………….Technology and Guerrilla Warfare
While the guerrilla's weapons remain the bomb and the rifle, more recently, advanced technology has also been introduced into guerrilla arsenal: night vision system, remote control explosives, communications systems, communications intelligence (COMINT) systems, ultra-light aircraft, anti-tank missiles, anti-aircraft systems, rockets with ranges of dozens of miles and other weapons that have added capabilities which enable, with minimum risk, long range target attacks, attack of armored vehicles, maintenance of an effective anti-aircraft defense, and receiving of early warning of enemy movements, which allow guerrilla fighters to vacate an area in time or to plan a surprise attack.
.................. Attributes of Counter-Guerrilla Warfare
A government struggling against a guerrilla movement is on its defense, from the strategic point of view. On the operational and tactical level, the struggle has defensive and offensive facets. Generally, governments recognize their inability to destroy the guerrilla movement and make do with wearing it down and minimizing its own attrition. This is also the goal of the guerrilla movement. The characterization of the counter-guerrilla struggle should be carried out in parallel with the delineation of the guerrilla movement's weaknesses. (Guerrillas do the same.)
The goals of a war against guerrillas are the preservation of the regime, of the population's normal course of life, and the removal of the strategic threat which the guerrilla movement constitutes." Military activity against the guerrilla movement includes policing activities, border patrols and guard duty, covert operations, counter-terror, and intelligence. It also involves political, economic, social, or diplomatic activities. Guerrilla warfare develops in parallel with the guerrilla movement in the areas of strategy, tactics, diplomacy, media, and so on, including cooperation with neighboring and friendly states. Those fighting against guerrilla movements understand the importance of the media in the battle for public opinion, but for the most part have yet to deal properly with this issue. Counter-guerrilla forces have adapted new weapon systems, but they do not direct sufficient technological efforts to research and development (R&D).
Guerrilla groups become more professional over the course of a conflict until they sometimes are on a higher quality level than the regular army units fighting them. For example, the Hizballah forces in Lebanon display a high level of field skills and expertise in operating mortars, rockets, ground-to-air missiles and intelligence gathering devices. A modern distinction of the asymmetries between regular and irregular warfare was formulated by Gotowicki.
…………… Counter-Guerrilla Task Force
Air power, in most cases, cannot win a counter-guerrilla war alone. However, unification of all functions of offensive operations (intelligence, planning, and execution) under the command of the air force, can bring about a revolution in the long term outcomes of campaigns against guerrilla forces. A model for the integration of advanced technology and quality manpower is the Air Force Counter-Guerrilla Task Force, a specialized task force for well-defined goals and missions. Its headquarters - an air force unit - would enjoy responsibility and authority for training the units, the development of operational and tactical doctrines, command in combat, and the operational evaluation of operations weapon systems. The US Air Force has built a Special Operation Forces unit (AFSOF). This unit is organized and employed in small formations, capable of both independent and supporting operations, with the purpose of enabling tailored responses. Plans are also inderconsideration to assign an Airforce General to lead USSPOCM or to lead a major counter terrortask force within USSPOCM or US Joint Forces Command (ASJFCOM).
……………Structure of Air Force Counter-Guerrilla Task Force
1. Intelligence Element : Collection Planning teams; UAVs unit; Ground observers; Target production; Analysis team; counter-intelligence
2. Command and Planning: C3 systems; C2 Teams; Professional experts
3. Operational Unit: Assault helicopters; Attack aircraft; Airborne commando; Electronic warfare
............Conduct of Operations
*** NOTE:
[ The following description of a large special forces operation is about to be launched into Colombia from Peru and Ecuador - to kill or capture guerrilla leaders - or the US may wait until it decides to assassinate Hugo Chavez in Venezuela.
A possible cycle of activities in a single operation is described. ]
The intelligence element belonging to the task force will search and locate a guerrilla force moving far from the front-line. Forces are scrambled to engage the guerrilla force and one force is flown to the designated area in order to engage the guerrilla. A special force of the airborne unit, deployed by assault helicopters nearby the guerrilla unit, uses laser designation systems to mark it for attack by air. Simultaneously, attack aircraft loaded with precision anti-personnel munitions takes off towards the guerrillas for the completion of the mission. Assault helicopters manned with an airborne elite unit are deployed in ambushes on the expected retreat routes of the guerrillas, in order to capture the survivors.
Throughout the entire procedure of scramble and engagement, contact is maintained with the guerrilla force by means of data collection (UAVs or sensors attached to guerrillas, spies or equipment) and would designate targets by laser designators and other means for aircraft and helicopters. The goal of the first wave attack is to destroy a part of the force and to 'freeze' the rest of it in place. At this point, after the guerrilla force has lost its maneuverability and mobility, since movement would expose it to additional volleys, attack aircraft and attack helicopters continue to destroy the guerrilla force. Finally, the elite unit would close in and finish off the battle. The few guerrillas who succeeded in escaping would probably run into the ambushes and be hit by them.
*** NOTE:
[ How would guerrilla counter this strategy and these types of operations?
How could they turn it into a trap ... or a defeat? ]
............... Intelligence
Counter-guerrilla Air Warfare planning and execution is intelligence- intensive. Operations planners use all-source intelligence from both organic and external intelligence sources. Harkabi, as a representative of the military viewpoint, emphasized the importance of tactical intelligence: "Development of tactical intelligence is important for counter-guerrilla warfare. Exploiting blind power against a 'stealthy' enemy as guerrilla is useless and dangerous."43 Air power requires 'real time intelligence,' since the swiftness of its operations demands knowledge on the enemy at the time of the execution of operations. Specific efforts are invested to satisfy this requirement."
NOTE: [ In Afghanistan these techniques of landing Rangers or other Special Forces near airforce targets worked extremely well. With the forward US forces identifying targets with laser devices, the accuracy of the JDAMS and other smart and not-so-smart bombs was precise and devastating against the Taliban bunkers. ]
A proper focus of intelligence on irregular forces should establish a database on various groups' identification and intentions, local political alignments and alliances, guerrilla goals and objectives. It should also monitor disaffected and radicalized individuals, and assess the influence and intentions of local religious leaders.
Air force intelligence gathering with special equipment and employing methods peculiar to aircraft is vital to counter-insurgency. By means of aerial reconnaissance, changes in insurgent deployment may be detected. The air force supplies air photos, expensive and rare systems and operations such as reconnaissance aircraft and satellites, SIGINT system, and new information warfare systems. The intelligence component gathers, collates, analyzes and processes tactical short-range, near-real-time information concerning the capabilities, intentions, and activities of actual and potential guerrilla enemies by using visual, imagery and electronic reconnaissance. At the same time it must identify the threats which might interfere with operations.
Accurate information on targets is the Achilles' heel of counter-guerrilla air warfare. Tracking human moving targets is more difficult than locating armor and fixed targets. Therefore, air power must shape unique requirements for sensors' research, development, testing and evaluation (RDT&E) and procurement. Experts on Low Intensity Conflict (LIC) have criticized the US military intelligence tendency to emphasize the technological side of intelligence, while LIC operations require effective political/human intelligence, which can be gathered and analyzed by well-educated people with operational experience....
After the following insert learn what the government has done to enhance both its intelligence gathering and its special operations capability... ---
Optional insert: Inside a US General:
Genral Peter Pace: Upfront Personal
http://www.european-security.com/index.php?id=3686 http://armedservices.house.gov/openingstatementsandpressreleases/108thcongress/03-06-18pace.html "Leadership is still leadership, but the tools that you have available to exercise that leadership have changed. Leadership principles have remained constant from Roman times through World Wars I and II to today
"Now we have the opportunity to get our message out much faster
and to many more people."
- General Peter Pace
In the past, a commander would pass information to his top officers, who would then pass information down the chain of command. Today, Pace said, a lot of the military planning is done at the leadership level using video teleconferences. Instead of just a handful of officers getting the word straight from the commander, hundreds of people can now absorb the information at the same time.
"That kind of impact is huge and it can be 'huge positive' or it can be 'huge negative,' depending upon what's being said and the individual leadership style," Pace said. "If you are a caring, thoughtful leader, in addition to your immediate subordinates, the other 500 guys watching know that. If you're less than that, they know.
"Body language on a video teleconference says a lot of things," he noted. "The exact same things that have always been important (still are), but they're magnified multiple times because of the ability to hit a large audience."
Video teleconferences give commanders a "powerful ability to quickly get the word out globally, good, bad or indifferent," he said. "But leaders are still going to be judged by their professional competence, and by the way they do or don't take care of those in their charge."
The advent of the Internet and e-mail has also broadened the scope of service members' knowledge of global events.
"It is possible now for a member of a rifle platoon to get on the Internet and see what the national policies are, what the regional policies are, or the regional events that are going on and how that impacts their missions," Pace said.
"When I was in Vietnam," he recalled, "my mail took about three weeks in one direction. By the time I got it, whatever the problem was or wasn't, was already finished. Now, e-mail goes back and forth all the time."
Rather than doing business in a news-free "bubble," he said, troops today are aware not only of their immediate environment, but that of the world if they want. "The vast majority of the force is plugged in 24/7 and can, if they want, educate themselves on a vast amount of information that otherwise would not be available. It certainly was not available to me 30 years ago."
"It amazes me," Pace said, "when my son or daughter says, 'You said this.' And I ask, 'How do you know that?' and they say 'I got on the Internet and punched up your name, pushed enter and the last three articles that quoted you came up.'
Gen. Pace and his son, Lt. Pete Pace, attended an Oct. 15, 2001, welcoming ceremony at Fort Myer, Va., in honor of the new vice chairman. The general is the first Marine to hold the vice chairmanship, the second-highest uniformed position in the Defense Department. DoD
U. S. Special Forces soldiers, with CIA guidance and assets, return to the intelligence business
After a hiatus of 30 years, the Pentagon's elite Special Forces soldiers will fight in the shadowy world of "actionable intelligence," covertly collecting information against terrorists and acting on that information with clandestine raids and attacks. The Washington Times (Feb. 19, 04) revealed that Army "Green Berets" will assume the role of "spies" in addition to their traditional combat roles. The intelligence networks that the Special Forces personnel have nurtured, and cultivated, have been in support of their own unit-unique initiatives and mission requirements. Collection skills have improved with time and experience. National-level intelligence agencies have shoehorned themselves into Special Forces intelligence operations that were initially designed for collection of tactical human intelligence. These ops gained strategic and global intelligence direction as they yielded bonanzas.
In the post-9/11 world, the intelligence community recognizes strength in the Special Forces that their own operatives lack. Establishing indigenous human intelligence operations in a rapidly developing or already fluid combat environment has not been a strong area for the ivy-league operatives. At least, not since the termination of the legendary Phoenix program in Vietnam in the mid-1970s. The Phoenix Phung Hoang (or Operation Phoenix) was a stroke of manifest brilliance by a former Saigon CIA station chief (and later CIA Director) William Colby. **** [ Actually a brutal war crimes campaign that killed or imprisoned thousands of innocent Vietnamese ;
see:
http://www.members.authorsguild.net/valentine/work3.htm ] The CIA relied upon the Special Forces as key players in the Phoenix program. The soldiers were often dispatched into the "denied-areas" in the war zone to perform their dangerous missions. Phoenix was basically the shortest distance between two points during the Vietnam War – those points being (1) the decision to liquidate an adversary, normally a well placed Viet Cong official, or his minions, and (2) the end-game of the operation: the capture, disappearance, or publicized assassination of the target.
Why are Special Forces soldiers once again preparing to begin conducting their own intelligence collection, which will likely be fully sanctioned and supported by the CIA?
Because they can.
What is clear is that the Department Of Defense is not going to be constrained and restricted, as in past decades, when it comes to aggressive intelligence collection efforts against our country's adversaries. In keeping with the veracity of the threat, Don Rumsfeld has also created the Pentagon's, first-ever, Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence.
The Army is stepping up intelligence training for Special Forces soldiers at SOCOM Headquarters in Florida, and at Ft. Lewis, Wash., the home of the 1st Special Forces Group. A source says that the Tacoma location is being run like a "Mini-Farm," referring to the highly classified CIA training facility at Camp Peary, Va. ( known to the CIA as "The Farm"). The Special Operations HQ for SOUTHCOM (Roosevelt Roads, Puerto Rico) is also expanding its numbers and its mission scope. Many of SOUTCOM's special ops forces are in and out of the jungle in Colombia, Ecudaor and Peru on a regular rotating basis.
Rumsfeld has given SOCOM new powers to plan and execute, "kill-or-capture-missions" against terrorists. To accomplish this goal, the SOCOM troops must have mission-unique intelligence information that is absolutely current -- a CIA paramilitary force. CIA activities must be acquiescent to U.S. law. At the same time, the CIA largely engages in activities that are intended to, and do evade international law. Special Forces soldiers are bound by both sets of legal standards. While Special Forces soldiers have been "sheep-dipped" in the past, and lived by CIA standards, the Pentagon does not want its soldiers violating laws that pertain to soldier conduct. CIA personnel on the other hand are unrestricted by the laws of war that particularly deal with uniforms, equipment and identities. They exploit this freedom to create "cover" identities for their missions.
If Special Forces soldiers are captured they have protection under the Geneva Convention that governs the treatment of POWs, but if the soldiers are operating undercover with CIA paramilitary units, they risk losing that protection. Enemies are aligned against the US in an unconventional fashion that is now termed, "fourth-generation warfare"… characterized by our adversary’s adroit use of methods that differ greatly from our usual mode of military doctrine and operations. They undermine our strengths and exploit our weaknesses as the single global superpower and seek to portray the US as a global villain picking on the little guy. If the US military doesn't "out-guerrilla the guerrilla," they lose the global war on terrorism.
… So it's imperative this new SF-CIA partnership continue. …
Super Technolgy to the Rescue!
Even the most competent of governments will find it nearly impossible to identify, locate, monitor, and, if appropriate, detain all of the terrorists, potential terrorists, and their supporters within its jurisdiction.
Fortunate for the ruling classes around the world, the US is developing and deploying increasingly sophisticated and accurate sensing device - everywhere and in almost every spectrum of energy.
Weapons
U.S. forces may be able to provide fire support to friendly units approaching or engaged in combat with terrorist groups. U.S. air forces are especially well suited to this task because of their ability to apply firepower precisely when and where it is needed. The AC- 130 gunship is, in many cases, the ideal platform for such missions today, since it combines an array of high-fidelity imaging sensors with weapons that can deliver accurate and sustained firepower of several calibers. In fact, the crew aboard an AC-130 orbiting over a battle may, at times, have a better appreciation of the overall situation than forces engaged on the ground. In addition, airpower in the form of tactical airlift and fire support has proven attractive in these situations because it can bring forces and firepower to bear on the enemy without having to move heavy equipment, such as trucks, armored vehicles, and artillery, over land. Airpower obviates the need to rely upon often primitive ground-transportation infrastructures. It also increases the possibility of gaining tactical surprise by limiting the enemy’s ability to observe preparations for an attack.
** Note
[ In the Iraqi battles around Falluja and Najaf (April - May 2004) the US used AC-130s with powerful and deadly results - the accuracy is not known, but many people were killed. ]
As a result, one can envisage a number of situations in which U.S. involvement in combined counterterrorist operations would be desirable but one or both sides would like to minimize the profile of U.S. forces. In such circumstances the Air Force could offer commanders capabilities, such as tactical intelligence and precision fire support, that could be brought to bear without leaving behind “fingerprints” associated with U.S. forces. Certain platforms, such as the Global Hawk unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV), are small enough that they cannot be seen from the ground when at their normal operating altitudes.
Likewise, AC-130s or bombers at altitude are difficult for terrorists to detect at night. If well integrated with forces on the ground, such platforms can, in many circumstances, greatly increase the prospects for success in offensive operations against terrorist and insurgent groups while leaving the source of the support ambiguous and unacknowledged.
DISRUPT THE ACTIVITIES OF TERRORISTS
If insurgents are permitted to determine the pace of their operations—that is, if they and not the government have the initiative —it is extremely difficult to suppress them because by choosing the time and place to strike, the insurgents can minimize the chances of tactical failure. Conversely, if government forces can keep the insurgents off-balance, many of the insurgents’ efforts will be diverted from planning and conducting offensive operations to trying simply to survive and avoid capture. People and groups under pressure for extended periods operate less effectively: they make more mistakes and they may find it more difficult to cooperate and to maintain organizational coherence. Counterinsurgency forces can exploit these openings.
Examples are:
• Disrupt communications and databases. No large organization can operate effectively without reliable communications and record keeping. Aggressive efforts to exploit and interfere with the communication links used by terrorist groups and to corrupt or mine computer files and other records can compel the enemy to adopt less-efficient modes of operation.
• Interdict the movement of critical materiel and personnel. Efforts to monitor and interdict the movement of ships, vehicles, aircraft, commercial air passengers, and people on foot through particular areas can be useful in a number of ways. Such efforts yield successes in preventing terrorist groups from acquiring or positioning weapons, explosives, or materiel needed for their operations. Second, continuous monitoring of traffic on a long-term basis provides analysts with a picture of what constitutes normal activity, making it easier to detect anomalies. Awareness of U.S. and allied interdiction efforts compels terrorist groups to adopt ways of doing business that are costly and less efficient than they would like, reducing their overall effectiveness.
SENSORS, DRONES (UAV) & What Trillions ($) Will Buy!
New generations of sensors will improve the ability of U.S. forces to detect and monitor the activities of small groups of enemy combatants. The Air Force is developing a new synthetic aperture radar (SAR) that operates simultaneously in the ultra high frequency (UHF) and very high frequency (VHF) bands and can detect stationary targets under foliage or camouflage. These sensors will not provide the resolution required for identifying (or perhaps even detecting) individuals, but they can be used to detect facilities and equipment (including weapons) that might be associated with terrorist groups and activities.
Improving assessment capabilities is also important. Most of the images and other data collected by U.S. intelligence sensors are never looked at or are given only a cursory examination. To better exploit the burgeoning “take” of these sensors, efforts are under way to develop new automated assessment tools that will include computer algorithms designed to detect specific activities by people or vehicles and to detect anomalous events or activities against an established baseline.
Technical surveillance systems, such as electro-optical sensors on UAVs, may be useful for this purpose. The problem of emphasizing force-protection measures is that such concerns can begin to compete with the overall mission of neutralizing terrorist groups. To reduce this competition, the DoD will need to develop and field affordable systems appropriate for monitoring activities around friendly bases. Fairly simple, low-cost systems could be adequate to this task. Small, low-speed UAVs with a time-on-station of a few hours have proven to be quite suitable for base-protection missions and are much less expensive than a Predator UAV. Unattended ground sensors (UGSs) may be useful for these tasks as well. They tend to have a smaller field of regard than sensors on airborne platforms, but they are relatively inexpensive and are on station 24 hours a day. Scanning lasers can be used to detect rifle scopes and other optics pointed at a base, and infrared backtracking systems can identify the source of sniper fire.
Prior to World War II, aerial bombardment was regarded as an instrument of mass terror; its targets were cities and the people and infrastructure within them. Theorists and practitioners in the US Army Air Corps were developing the doctrine of daylight precision bombardment. The objective was to destroy key elements of an enemy’s war-supporting industrial base so as to render continued military operations impossible. The Gulf War, however, was the first time that precisionguided munitions (PGMs) were used on a large scale. The availability of large numbers of PGM-capable fighter-bombers, combined with the fact that coalition air forces were able to achieve air supremacy over Iraq within the first few days of the war, meant that far more precision was possible and expected from U.S. air operations. Individual buildings or, in many cases, specific portions of buildings were chosen for attack.
This trend accelerated in Operations Deliberate Force and Allied Force—the efforts to end Serbian aggression in Bosnia and Kosovo, respectively. Targets included buildings in urban areas, small groups of soldiers within villages, and individual vehicles within convoys. The same sorts of targets have been prominent in Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan. There, U.S. air forces have had some success in locating and attacking small groups of terrorists, particularly when trained tactical air controllers have been available to assist in identifying targets and providing attack platforms with target coordinates. The most intriguing capability to be demonstrated in Afghanistan is the armed Predator UAV. The small size and quiet engine of the Predator make it difficult for people on the ground to detect even when it is directly overhead. These features, coupled with an endurance on station approaching 24 hours, have allowed operators to track potential targets for extended periods. The Hellfire missile carried by the Predator permits accurate attacks on individual vehicles or small groups of people in clear weather, using laserhoming guidance.
U.S. strategy recognizes that not all adversaries will be deterred by traditional means—by the threat to inflict unacceptable damage in retaliation for enemy attacks.
TOWARD NEW CONCEPTS FOR LOCATING AND ATTACKING TERRORISTS AND RELATED TARGETS
Improvements are called for in the capabilities of U.S. air forces to identify, and attack small groups of people with appropriate levels of confidence that the right target is being attacked and that innocent civilians will not be placed at undue risk. Opportunities exist to define new and more effective concepts of execution (CONEXs) for engaging such targets.
Terrorists will try to operate in areas and ways that make them difficult to find, identify, and isolate. Depending on the country in which they are operating, they may be in wilderness areas that feature mountains, caves, forest, or jungle canopy. They may be living in rural areas, using anonymous-looking dwellings or small encampments. They may choose urban environments, again occupying unexceptional buildings. Within these environments, terrorists may be either stationary or moving, with movement being by vehicle or on foot. In all cases, the terrorists may be in the company of noncombatants—either family members or unrelated strangers. Any new concept for engaging such a demanding target set should seek to incorporate innovations among “finders, controllers, and shooters.”
WIDE-AREA SURVEILLANCE
“Finders”—intelligence, reconnaissance, and surveillance assets— will be of two broad types: those that provide wide-area coverage and those with a narrow field of view but higher resolution. The role of wide-area assets will be to provide information about the overall operations of targeted groups and to identify those areas that might merit more intensive investigation. Assets available today include networks of human informants (HUMINT), signals intelligence collectors (SIGINT), and imaging sensors that provide pictures of potential targets. Each of these types of assets has its strengths and limitations. A severe limitation of most imagery sensors is their inability to see through heavy foliage—a major problem in countries such as the Philippines that are heavily forested. Foliage penetration SAR and moving-target indication (MTI) radars, which have been under development for several years, could significantly enhance U.S. wide-area surveillance capabilities in such regions, helping to find objects that merit reexamination using a higher-resolution sensor.
Emerging technologies for multispectral and hyperspectral sensors will make it possible to remotely examine phenomena across the electromagnetic spectrum. Because every material has a unique signature, data from such sensors can be processed and used to classify objects automatically and with greater fidelity than is possible with sensors that operate in only a single waveband. By comparing this information against a database of objects of interest, analysts using appropriate algorithms can sort through masses of data quickly to locate objects and activities that merit closer examination.
Other promising technologies with the potential to enhance widearea search capabilities are chemical “sniffers.” Essentially miniature, mobile chemical-analysis laboratories, sniffers are able to detect traces of certain chemicals in the atmosphere. If it were possible to develop sniffers to detect particular types of explosives, then lowflying aircraft or ground vehicles could patrol large areas and highlight places where bomb factories, arms caches, or potential suicide bombers might be operating. Stocks of chemical weapons or precursor materials might also be detectable. In addition, certain types of illegal drugs or the chemicals used in their processing might be useful targets for sniffers, given the nexus between drug traffickers and terrorists in some areas (e.g., Colombia). Miniature UAVs could carry spectrometers and sample-collection/analysis devices, transmitting data or returning physical samples back to a “mothership” or a ground station.
HIGH-RESOLUTION SENSORS
Sensors employed for wide-area searches help analysts to gain a clearer picture of the nature of the enemy’s organization and operations and to identify places where other human and technical assets can be concentrated in hopes of gaining confirmation of the presence or absence of the enemy and, perhaps, the identity of individual terrorists. Such sensors, be they human sources or technical means, ideally should provide continuous monitoring of suspect areas and persons. They should also be covert; that is, able to function without tipping off targets that they are under surveillance.
These requirements—high resolution, continuous and long-term coverage, and secrecy—suggest that sensors to support targeting should, in general, be small so that they can be easily concealed. Small imaging sensors, in turn, must be placed close to their targets, given the need for high resolution and restrictions on focal length.2 And sensors that need to “stare” at their targets for prolonged periods should generally not be on airborne platforms but rather placed on buildings or other fixed structures, or in trees.
Automated processing tools are being developed to help analysts efficiently screen the masses of data being gathered by new generations of sensors. Such tools are especially important in counterterrorist operations because the signatures associated with most terrorist groups are generally very small and the “noise” surrounding them is often considerable. U.S. and Pakistani officials are attempting to apprehend perhaps several hundred individuals in the city of Karachi, which has a population in excess of five million. Under such circumstances, a surveillance and identification system that boasted an error rate of only 1:1000 could still give off many false alarms for each correct identification.
Conventional cameras cannot see inside buildings if the occupants are cautious and if it is not possible to plant devices inside. One means of gaining information about activities inside a building is to listen to what is being said there. Occasionally, it may be possible to plant listening devices (“bugs”) in buildings or vehicles being used by terrorists. More often, antiterrorist forces will have to rely on remote means of monitoring. It has been demonstrated that one can sometimes listen in on conversations inside a building by using lasers to detect the propagation of sound waves off the building’s windows.
Experiments are also under way with radars that have the potential to “see” through walls. The resolution of such radars is, of course, modest, but it is possible to determine whether particular rooms in a structure are occupied or not—information that can be valuable when planning an attack. Another emerging technology that can be useful in identifying terrorists is facial-recognition software. If cameras can be placed in areas where terrorists might pass by, the images they collect could be rapidly screened against a database of facial images and perhaps other physical characteristics of known terrorists. Computer algorithms capable of comparing collected images against a large database and discriminating among key features of those images will be essential if this approach is to be effective. Even with these systems, additional efforts would be required to verify the identity of potential targets, given the large number of samples collected and likely false-alarm rates.
Tagging suspected vehicles could help in developing information about patterns of activity and assisting shooters in engaging elusive targets. For example, an operative on the ground in a city could covertly place a transmitter on a car that is being used by a group suspected of conducting terrorist activities. Once attached, the transmitter could permit authorities to monitor that vehicle’s movements, perhaps pointing them to other groups of terrorists. Signals from the transmitter could also make it easier to keep the suspect vehicle “in the crosshairs” should a decision be taken to detain its occupants or destroy the vehicle.
CONCLUSIONS
The US is spending a fortune on the war in Iraq while at the same time it is restructuring its entire military force structure to combat fourth generation wars that will be common soon. The dramatic expantion of US Special Operations forces and their tranformation into a quasi-illegal CIA paramilitary army will give the US awesome and flexible deployment options. With a wide array of listening devices and airborne - or spaceborne - sensors the US will be able to attack small targets with devastation. These policies make sense once diplomacy, cooperation, compromise and any hope of a peaceful world are abandoned permanently. But this is a one-way street and the response of the adversaries will be ingenious and unexpected... and so must ours...
Notes:
1. The operations of Philippine forces against Abu Sayef Group (ASG) rebels provide a recent example of this. Over the course of several months, U.S. special forces in-country trained with their Philippine counterparts, focusing on individual soldier skills and small-unit tactics. New equipment, including rifles and ammunition, was also provided. U.S. forces also offered assistance in planning patrol operations. The result was more frequent and more effective patrols that led to the freeing of one American hostage and the elimination of several terrorists. Follow-on training missions are planned. Similar “Successes” have occurred in Nepal and Colombia.
2. Air Force helicopters used for infiltration and exfiltration of special forces can also provide battlefield medical evacuation capabilities. U.S. capabilities for nighttime medical evacuation by helicopter were said to be particularly valuable to Philippine forces engaged in the hunt for members of the ASG in 2002
3. In modern usage, the term (and the strategy) originated with the British campaign against communist insurgents in Malaya after World War II. In the words of Lt. Gen. Sir Gerald Templer, the British High Commissioner to Malaya in the early 1950s, “The shooting side of the business is only 25 percent of the trouble. The other 75 percent is getting the people of this country behind us” (Richard Stubbs, Hearts and Minds in Guerrilla Warfare: The Malayan Emergency, 1948–1960, Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK, 1991, p. 259).
4. For more on the integration of psychological operations and air operations, see Stephen T. Hosmer, Psychological Effects of U.S. Air Operations in Four Wars, 1941– 1991, RAND, MR-576-AF, 1996, especially pp. 199–202.
5. For more on concepts for countering snipers, see Alan Vick et al., Aerospace
Operations in Urban Environments: Exploring New Concepts, RAND, MR-1187-AF, 2000, pp. 131–138.
6. U.S. air forces deployed to Operation Desert Storm included more than 250 fixedwing aircraft that were capable of delivering laser-guided bombs. They were supplemented by several squadrons of British Tornadoes and a handful of other PGMcapable allied aircraft.
7. For an overview of emerging sensor technologies and their potential to support operations against dispersed groups of enemy personnel, see Alan Vick et al., Enhancing Airpower’s Contribution Against Light Infantry Targets, RAND, MR-697-AF, 1996, pp. 13–30.
8. For a review of the current state of the art in imaging sensor technologies and their potential for miniaturization, see Alan Vick et al., 2000, pp. 83–107.
9. In some situations, such sensors can be emplaced by agents on the ground. In others, delivery by air might be preferred. The Internetted Unattended Ground Sensor (IUGS) program, initiated by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, is developing an air-delivered body with magnetic, seismic, acoustic, chemical, and environmental sensors that can detect human and vehicular movements. See Alan Vick et al., 1996, pp. 26–27.
10. Satellite Improvements;
For a story on US espionage/disruption see:
http://augustachronicle.com/stories/030103/ira_124-3010.shtml Short Article on UAVs:
http://augustachronicle.com/stories/021303/ira_124-2140.shtml Indy pub:
http://southafrica.indymedia.org/news/2004/05/5993.php 
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