CUSTOMARY DIVORCE IN INDIA.
A work analysing the customary divorce in India.
The aim of this article is to explore the inverse relationship of a custom empowering the parties to the marriage to dissolve their marriage and the sacramental continuity of a marriage soleminised under the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. A valid and legally recognised custom is respected and given due weight by the courts so that it can have its full operation. This is so because no person, including a court, has a right to challenge a well recognised and universally accepted custom, which has passed the test of time and the rigorous of public and societal interest.
Marriage is the very foundation of a civilised society. The relation once formed, the law step in and binds the parties to various obligations and liabilities thereunder. Marriage is an institution in the maintenance of which the public at large is deeply interested. It is the foundation of the family and in turn of the society without which no civilisation can exist. A marriage solemnised, whether before or after the commencement of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (Act) can only be dissolved by a decree of divorce on any of the grounds enumerated in Section 13 of the Act. Till the time a Hindu marriage is dissolved under the Act none of the spouses can contract second marriage. Thus, it is obvious from the various provisions of the Act that the modern Hindu Law strictly enforces monogamy. Even under the Muslim Law plurality of marriage is not unconditionally conferred upon the husband. Muslim law as traditionally interpreted and applied in India permits more than one marriage during the subsistence of one and another though capacity to do justice between co wives in law is condition precedent. As per the Hindu Law administered by courts in India divorce was not recognised as a means to put an end to marriage, which was always considered to be a sacrament, with only exception where it is recognised by custom. Public policy, good morals and the interests of society were considered to require and ensure that, if at all, severance should be allowed only in the manner and for the reason or cause specified in law. One of the causes expressly recognised by law is the legal sanction of a valid custom to dissolve a marriage. Thus the rules of dissolution of marriage and monogamy are subject to a valid custom to the contrary. This shows that the law relating to marriage and divorce of Hindus has an inverse relationship with a recognised valid custom. If a Hindu custom allows the parties to the marriage to dissolve their marriage as per the custom, then the Act cannot prohibit its operation, even if it goes against the basic spirit of the Act.
II. The inverse relationship
The importance of the custom in relation to the applicability of the Act has been acknowledged by the Legislature by incorporating Section 29(2) providing that nothing in the Act can affect any right, recognised by custom or conferred by any said enactment to obtain the dissolution of a Hindu Marriage whether solemnised before or after the commencement of the Act even without the proof of the conditions precedent for declaring the marriage invalid as incorporated in Sections 10 to 13 of the Act. Thus, a marriage which may not be permissible to be dissolved as per the provisions of the Act can still be dissolved if the party relying on a custom can successfully plead and prove it. This shows that a valid and recognised customary law of divorce will prevail over the provisions of the Act and thus it shares an inverse relationship with the provisions of the Act, which restrict the right of the spouses to get divorce on limited grounds only. It must be noted that the customary law of divorce can be relied upon only if it satisfies certain well-accepted principles, as enumerated by the Courts from time to time. The characteristics of a valid and binding custom or usage empowering the parties to obtain divorce are:
(1) it must be of immemorial existence, it must be reasonable, it must, be certain and it must be continuous. Every custom must have to be in existence preceding memory of man and if the proof was carried back as far as living memory would go, it should be presumed that the right claimed had existed from time of legal memory,
(2) it is the essence of special usages modifying the ordinary law that they should be ancient and invariable; it is further essential that they should be established to be so, by clear and unambiguous evidence and that it is only by means of such findings that the Courts can be assured of their existence and that they possess the conditions of antiquity and continuity and certainty on which alone their legal title to recognition depends. Custom must be proved and the burden of proof is on the person who asserts it,
(3) after the existence of a custom for some years has been proved by direct evidence, it can only, as a rule, be shown to be immemorial by hearsay evidence and it is for this reason that such an evidence is allowable as an explanation to the general rule,
(4) the breach of a custom in a particular instance need not destroy it for all times,
(5) the material customs must be proved in the first instance by calling witnesses acquainted with them until a particular custom has by frequent proof in the Court becomes so notorious that the Courts take judicial notice of it. A custom cannot be extended by logical process,
(6) an oral evidence as to instances, which can be proved, by documentary evidence cannot be fairly relied upon to establish custom when no satisfactory explanation for withholding the best evidence is given. Custom cannot be extended by analogy and it cannot be established by a priori method, and
(7) the ordinary rule is that a custom, general or otherwise, has to be proved under Section 57 of the Evidence Act. However, nothing need be proved of which the Courts can take judicial notice. When a custom has been judicially recognised by the Court then it passes into the law of the land as proof of it becomes unnecessary under Section 57(1) of the Evidence Act.
III. Judicial response
The response of the courts in India is two fold. On the one hand they respect the mandates of the valid and well-recognised customs whereas on the other hand any attempt, which fails to satisfy the rigours of public policy and societal interests, is thwarted at the very threshold. The courts are also very conscious to ensure that the requirement of the existence of a valid custom are duly fulfilled and they must be expressly pleaded and clearly established before any relief is granted. The general impression is that since these customs are going against the basic theme and policy of the Act, they must be construed narrowly and strictly. At the same time once these customs are validly recognised even in the limited, narrowed and restricted parameters of societal interests, they are given their due weight age and the wisdom of courts is not substituted for their wisdom and recognition.
In Sankarlingam v Subban divorce by consent was held valid as a matter of custom of the Pakhali caste of Ahmedabad observing that there was nothing immoral in a caste custom by which divorce and remarriage were permitted by mutual agreement. There was no invalidity in a custom by which married couple on account of disagreement between them by consent could divorce and were divorced by parties approaching the headman and other relations, paying certain amount and taking away tali or the sacred thread from round the wife's neck and giving it back to the husband. It was only when the divorce was enforced against the wishes of his wife that the custom permitted divorce would be illegal.
In Pakhali Jina Magan v Bai Jethi it was held that a custom of divorce with mutual consent of husband and wife stated to exist among the Hindus of Pakhali caste of Ahmedabad was not repugnant to Hindu Law. When it was contended that the institution of divorce was itself opposed to the concept of Hindu law and that there was no decision of any Court in India which held a custom of divorce as valid as it was observed that divorce is not contemplated by the Hindu Law but it is not repugnant to its principles, and if there be a well established custom in its support, it may override the general provisions of that law. It was further observed that there had been many cases in our Courts arising out of divorce in the lower castes. In all those cases even where it was held that the divorce had not been properly granted, it had been taken for granted that the custom of divorce can validly exist in a particular community, especially if it is a Sudra community, but that divorce granted cannot be forced by the caste against an unwilling person.
In Veerappa Chettiar v Michael the main question involved in both the appeals was whether the marriage of Bangaru Ammal was in Asura form or in Brahma form. The contention of the appellant was that it was not in Asura form. The Court held that the marriage of Bangaru Ammal was not in Asura form but in Brahma form. The Court observed: “Except a bare allegation in the plaint that the said marriage was held in Asura form, the plaintiffs did not give any particulars or set up any custom in the community to which the parties to the marriage belonged. There was nothing to show that there was a practice in the family to give Kambu as 'Parisam for the bride or Kambu was paid as 'Parisam' at the time of the betrothal ceremony in connection with the marriage of Bangaru Ammal. We are also in these appeals not concerned with any customary form of marriage but only with a marriage sanctioned by Hindu Law, for no custom was pleaded in derogation of Hindu Law. But there may be a custom in a community not in derogation of the Hindu Law but in regard to the manner of complying with a condition laid down by Hindu Law. That is to say if the criterion for an Asura marriage was that there should be a sale of the bride, there may be a custom in a community in regard to the manner of paying the consideration' for the sale”.
In Shakuntalabai v V.L.V. Kulkarni the Supreme Court held that custom must be proved and the burden of proof is on the person who asserts it. A custom cannot be extended by logical process. The Court observed: “ Customs cannot be extended by analogy and it cannot be established by a priori method. Further, nothing need be proved of which the Courts can take judicial notice. When a custom has been judicially recognised by the Court then it passes into the law of the land as proof of it becomes unnecessary under section 57(1) of the Evidence Act. The Court entertaining no doubt that there has been ancient and unbroken customs of dissolution of marriage and of Serai Udiki marriage among the Panchamasal Lingayats which was judicially noticed by the Courts, and that the marriage in the instant case, of the fourth defendant with Gurulingappa was proved to have been customarily dissolved and that she was subsequently legally married with Gurappa in the valid customary form of Udiki marriage, whereafter, she lived with Gurappa as husband and wife until Gurappa died, and that, thereafter, she enjoyed the family pension by dint of her being nominated as wife of Gurappa to the knowledge of all concerned. She was accepted by the community as wife of Gurappa even after his death. There is, therefore, no scope for declaring the marriage illegal posthumously”.
In Dr. Surajmani Stella Kujur v D.C.Hansdah (14-02-01) the Supreme Court observed: “It is conceded even by the appellant that the parties to the petition are two Tribals, who otherwise profess Hinduism, but their marriage being out of the purview of Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 in light of Section 2(2) of the Act, are thus governed only by their Santal Customs and usage. The appellant has, however, relied upon an alleged custom in the Tribe, which mandates monogamy as a rule. It is submitted that as the respondent has solemnized a second marriage during the subsistence of the first marriage with the appellant, the second marriage being void, the respondent is liable to be prosecuted for the offence punishable under Section 494 of the Indian Penal Code. No custom can create an offence as it essentially deals with the civil rights of the parties and no person can be convicted of any offence except for violation of law in force at the time of commission of the act charged. Custom may be proved for the determination of the civil rights of the parties including their status, the establishment of which may be used for the purposes of proving the ingredients of an offence which, under Section 3(37) of the General Clauses Act, would mean an act or omission punishable by any law by way of fine or imprisonment. Article 20 of the Constitution, guaranteeing protection in respect of conviction of offence, provides that no person shall be convicted of any offence except for violation of law in force at the time of commission of the act charged as an offence. Law under Article 13 clause (3) of the Constitution means the law made by the Legislature including intravires statutory, orders and orders made in exercise of powers conferred by the statutory rules. For custom to have the colour of a rule or law, it is necessary for the party claiming it to plead and thereafter prove that such custom is ancient, certain and reasonable. Custom being in derogation of the general rule is required to be construed strictly. The party relying upon a custom is obliged to establish it by clear and unambiguous evidence. Nowhere in the complaint the appellant has referred to any alleged custom having the force of law, which prohibits the solemnisation of second marriage by the respondent and the consequences thereof. It may be emphasised that mere pleading of a custom stressing for monogamy by itself was not sufficient unless it was further pleaded that second marriage was void by reason of its taking place during the life of such husband or wife. In order to prove the second marriage being void, the appellant was under an obligation to show the existence of a custom, which made such marriage null, ineffectual, having no force of law or binding effect, incapable of being enforced in law or non- est. The fact of second marriage being void is a sine qua non for the applicability of Section 494 IPC. It is settled position of law that for fastening the criminal liability, the prosecution or the complainant is obliged to prove the existence of all the ingredients constituting the crime which is normally and usually defined by a statute. In view of the fact that parties admittedly belong to the Scheduled Tribes and in the absence of specific pleadings, evidence and proof of the alleged custom making the second marriage void, no offence under Section 494 of the Indian Penal Code can possibly be made out against the respondent”.
In Yamanaji Jadhav v Nirmala the Supreme Court observed: “We find that the courts below have erroneously proceeded on the basis that the divorce deed relied upon by the parties in question was a document which is acceptable in law. It is to be noted that the deed in question is purported to be a document, which is claimed to be in conformity with the customs applicable for divorce in the community to which the parties to this litigation belong.
Thus such a custom being an exception to the general law of divorce ought to have been specially pleaded and established by the party propounding such custom since said custom of divorce is contrary to the law of the land and which, if not proved, will be a practice opposed to public policy. In the instant case, we have perused the pleadings of the parties before the trial court and we do not find any material to show that prevalence of any such customary divorce in the community, based on which the document of divorce was brought into existence was ever pleaded by the defendant as required by law or any evidence was led in this case to substantiate the same. It is true in the courts below that the parties did not specifically join issue in regard to this question and the lawyers appearing for the parties did orally agree that the document in question was in fact in accordance with the customary divorce prevailing in the community to which the parties belonged but this consensus on the part of the counsel or lack of sufficient pleading in the plaint or in the written statement would not, in our opinion, permit the court to countenance the plea of customary divorce unless and until such customary divorce is properly established in a court of law. In our opinion, even though the plaintiff might not have questioned the validity of the customary divorce, the court ought to have appreciated the consequences of their not being a customary divorce based on which the document of divorce has come into existence bearing in mind that a divorce by consent is also not recognisable by a court unless specifically permitted by law. Therefore, we are of the opinion to do complete justice in this case it is necessary that the trial court be directed to frame a specific issue in regard to customary divorce based on which the divorce deed dated 26th of June, 1982 has come into existence and which is the subject matter of the suit in question. In this regard, we permit the parties to amend the pleadings, if they so desire and also to lead evidence to the limited extent of proving the existence of a provision for customary divorce (otherwise through the process of or outside court) in their community and then test the validity of the divorce deed dated 26.6.1982 based on the finding arrived at in deciding the new issue”.
A close reading and appreciations of the traditional Hindu Law and the Act reveals that the codification of the traditional Hindu Law is a positive step in the right direction, which recognises a benign movement from the statehood of non-recognition to the platform of recognition of grounds for divorce. The traditional Hindu law did not recognise the system of divorce and the husbands were literally free to desert their wives, as this was a socially accepted phenomenon. There was, of course, the customary law which recognised that divorce can be granted by either party to the marriage if a custom prevailing in their community permits them to do so. The legislature by way of codification has improved the “marital equality” among the spouses by formulating certain grounds, which can be invoked by either spouse to get a decree of divorce. In this sense the legislature has made “positive and constructive departures” from the traditional Hindu law. The best part about this codification drive is that it expressly and in clear terms reserved the right to grant divorce under the customary Hindu law by incorporating Section 29(2) in the Act. Thus, the spouses are now free to get divorce either by invoking the provisions of the Act or by successfully pleading and proving a valid custom permitting them to obtain divorce.
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 (2002) 2 SCC 637.