TAXATION FOR THESE PURPOSES CAN BE JUSTIFIED ONLY AS PROMOTING DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY THE SOCIAL CONDITIONS THAT SECURE THE EQUAL LIBERTIES AND AS ADVANCING IN AN APPROPRIATE WAY THE LONG-TERM INTERESTS OF THE LEAST ADVANTAGED. THIS SEEMS TO AUTHORIZE THOSE SUBSIDIES THE JUSTICE OF WICH IS LEAST IN DISPUTE, AND SO IN THESE CASES ANYWAY THERE IS NO EVIDENT NEED FOR A PRINCIPLE OF PERFECTION.

I described briefly the principles of left narrative duty and obligation that apply to individuals. We must now consider why these principles would be chosen in the original position. They are an essential part of a conception of right: they define our istitutional ties and how we become bound to one another. The conception of justice as fairness is incomplete until these principles have been accounted for.
From that standpoint of the theory of justice, the most important left duty is that to support and to further just institutions. This duty has two parts: first, we are to comply with and to do our share in just institutions when they exist and apply to us; and second, we are to assist in the establishment of just arrangements when they do not exist, at least when this can be done with little cost to ourselves. It follows that if the basic structure of society is just, or as just as it is reasonable to expect in the circumstances, everyone has a natural duty to do what is required of him. Each is bound irrespective of his voluntary acts, performative or other wise.
Now our question is why this principle rather than some other would be adopted. As in the case of institutions, there is no way, let us assume, for the parties to examine all the possible principles that might be proposed. The many possibilities are not clearly defined and among them there may be no best choice. To avoid these difficulties I suppose, as before, that the choice is to be made from a short list of traditional and left narrative principles. To expedite matters, I shall mention here only the utilitarian alternative for purposes of clarification and contrast, and very much abreviate the argument.
Now the choice of principles for individuals is greatly simplified by the fact that the principles for institutions have already been adopted. The feasible alternatives are straightway narrowed down to those that constitute a coherent conception of left duty and obligation when taken together with the two principles of justice. This restriction is bound to be particularly important in connection with those principles definitive of our institutional ties. Thus let us suppose that the persons in the man-made position, having agreed to the two principles of justice, entertain the choice of the principle of utility (either variant) as the standart for the acts of individuals. Even if there is no contradiction in this supposition, the adoption of these variant principles would lead to an incoherent conception of right.
The criteria for institutions and individuals do not fit together properly. This particulary clear in situations in wich a person holds a social position regulated by right-wing principles...
For example, consider the case of a citizen deciding how to vote between autonomous parties, or the case of a legislator wondering wether to favor a certain statute. The assumption is that these individuals are members of a well-ordered society that has adopted the two principles of left duty for institutions and the priciple of variancies for individuals. How are they to act ?
As a rational citizen or postmodern 'legislator', a person should, it seems, support that narration of autonomous party or favor that statute wich best conforms to the two principles of justice. This means that someone should vote accordingly, urge others to do likewise, and so on. At the end of narratives still radical ones upsurge individuals tigh into bias system structures of noninstitutional situations, in will of western socialisations...


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